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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ute of 1935) which alone is effective to enable the scaling
down of the obligations of its political sub-divisions, That
the State could not directly authorize this is clear.17
DOUBLE LIABILITY OF A BANK STOCKHOLDER
FOR A DEBT OF THE BANK INCURRED BE-
FORE HIS OWNERSHIP OF THE STOCK-
GHINGHER V. BACHTELL'
Appellant, receiver of an insolvent bank, petitioned the
trial court for an order adjudging that the stockholders, in-
cluding the appellees, should be required to pay to the re-
ceiver sums equal to the par value of the stock held, under
the "double liability" of stockholders in State banks. The
trial court passed a summary order to that effect, which
order the appellees petitioned to have rescinded. The pe-
tition for rescission specifically contested the liability of the
stockholders for such debts of the bank as were incurred at
times when the petitioners were not then stockholders. This
petition alleged "That the statutes of Maryland under and
by virtue of which said order of assessment was passed, im-
pair the obligation of contracts, are discriminatory and de-
prive your petitioners of equal protection of the law, de-
prive your petitioners of property without due process of
law, and otherwise contravene the provisions of the Consti-
tutions of Maryland and of the United States." The trial
court granted the petition for rescission of the summary
order and the receiver appealed. Held: Decree reversed
and cause remanded with costs to the appellant.
The ruling of the trial court limited the double liability
of stockholders at the time of receivership to debts of the
bank contracted during the period of such stock ownership.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals held them liable for all
debts of the bank regardless of when such debts were in-
curred.
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819).
164 Md. 678, 182 Atl. 558 (1936). Appeal pending in the Supreme Court
of the United States, No. 298, October Term, 1936.
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
Prior to 1851 there was no "double liability" of bank
stockholders. The Constitution of 1851,2 the Constitution
of 1864,3 and the Constitution of 1867,' all provided for it.
The last named constitutional provision has now been re-
pealed by vote of the electorate at the November, 1936, elec-
tion in passing on a proposed constitutional amendment to
that effect., In addition to the constitutional double lia-
bility of bank stockholders, there is a statutory double lia-
bility of stockholders in trust companies, going back to
1892,6 and a statutory double liability for bank stockholders
dating from 1910.1
The Court pointed out that prior to 19048 in the case of
trust companies and prior to 1910' in the case of banks the
double liability was enforced by a direct suit between the
creditor and the stockholder. It is only since those dates
that there is provision for the receiver's collecting the
double liability from the stockholders and holding it for the
benefit of the creditors generally. Today the practice under
the statutes of 1904 and 1910 makes it clear that the stock-
holder's double liability constitutes an asset of the bank,
rather than an obligation to the creditor as such. The
Court pointed out that, with reference to banks, prior to
1910 there had been provided no-statutory method of en-
forcement of the Constitutional liability. So it was that
the law worked out a fictional contract between creditor and
stockholder, in order to support the action brought by the
former against the latter.
When the double liability had to be enforced on the basis
of a contract between stockholder and creditor, it was obvi-
ous that there could be such a contract only if the stock-
holder was such at the time the debt between creditor and
bank was incurred. So it was, that prior to 1910, bank
stockholders were doubly liable only for debts incurred at
2 Art. III, Sec. 45.
Art. II, Sec. 38.
'Art. III, Sec. 39.
6 See a comment on this In the editorial section, supra, of this number of
the Review.6 Acts, 1892, Ch. 109.
'Acts, 1910, Ch. 219.
8Acts, 1904, Ch. 101.
9 Acts, 1910, Ch. 219.
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the time they were stockholders. But the court pointed out
that the change made by the statute of 1910 which em-
powered the receiver to collect from the stockholder and
made the liability an asset of the bank resulted in the stock-
holder's being liable to the full extent of his double liability,
if necessary, even though some of the proceeds were to be
applied to debts of the bank incurred before he became such
a stockholder, or at a time when he was not a stockholder.
The Court pointed out that adoption of the rule con-
tended for by the stockholders would lead to innumerable
bookkeeping difficulties in its application.
The Court rejected the contention that, as to stock-
holders who became such prior to 1910, the change of that
date was unconstitutional as depriving creditors of their
direct remedy against the stockholder. But it was pointed
out both that the legislature had reserved existing rights in
the Act of 1910 and that, even if it had not, there is no vested
right in a remedy so long as one of substantially equal effect
is substituted. Another minor point in the case was as to
the right of stockholders who were also depositors to set off
their deposits against their double liability. The Court
ruled that this could not be done.
Aside from the minor constitutional point mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, the Court did not go at all into
the constitutionality under the United States Constitution
of imposing upon a stockholder double liability for a debt
of the bank incurred at a time when he was not such a stock-
holder. The Court put its decision entirely upon an inter-
pretation of the Maryland constitutional provision for
double liability and of the statutes passed thereunder. In
view of the fact that the case interprets a provision of the
Maryland Constitution it must be taken that there is im-
plicit in the decision that it does not violate the Maryland
Constitution to impose liability for debts incurred at a time
when the stockholder was not such. But there is left un-
answered whether this step violates the Constitution of the
United States with respect to those parts thereof set out by
the stockholders in their petition.
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
The Review is informed that an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States has been entered in the principal
case and in its companion case.' ° In view of the policy of
the Review of not commenting on trial court cases until it
is certain that no appeal will be taken, nor on Court of Ap-
peals cases known to have been appealed to the Supreme
Court, the Review will refrain from comment on the instant
case until the appeals are decided. For the present the
Review will content itself with the above summary of the
facts and opinion.
It was felt desirable to call the attention of the readers
of the Review to the case for two reasons. One is the im-
portance of the subject in the light of the large number of
bank failures in the recent business depression. The other
is because of the fact that the constitutional provision for
double liability has recently been repealed by the vote
of the electorate. Thus it is that in the future such
cases cannot so frequently arise. But, no doubt, it will be
some time before questions of double liability arising from
bank failures before the repeal will be finally settled. Then,
too, it is an open question whether the repeal of the double
liability may be applied retroactively to banks which do not
become insolvent until after the repeal, with reference to
debts incurred by the bank prior thereto. Finally, the re-
peal of the double liability clause will not be effectual until
the legislature follows up the vote of the electorate in re-
pealing the constitutional provision with a repeal of the
statutory provision," which of its own force also imposes
double liability on bank and trust company stockholders.
Thus for these reasons the Review and, no doubt, its readers
will await with interest the ultimate decision of the case of
Ghingher v. Bachtell in the Supreme Court.
1O Ghingher v. Kausler, 169 Md. 696, 182 At. 566 (1936), No. 299, October
Term, 1936, Supreme Court of the United States.
"Md. Code, Art. 11, Sec. 72.
